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Asiana pilot says he was blinded by light prior to crash
Federal crash investigators revealed Wednesday that the pilot flying Asiana Airlines flight 214 told them that he was temporarily blinded by a bright light when 500 feet above the ground. Deborah Hersman, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, said it wasn't clear what could have caused the problem. Asked specifically whether it could have been a laser pointed from the ground, Hersman said she couldn't say what caused it. (www.usatoday.com) More...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
I was on that flight when it happened and they started descending so low we finished by spining around and then 2 minutes after the impact fire started first in the first class. since actually the pilot said to don't evacuate we were almost killed by this fire thanks to the crew for saving so much lives!!
"The NTSB final report will be interesting.99% of folks on here already have it PILOT ERROR for various reasons. We shall see."
NTSB has made it clear that the aircraft was operating completely normally and as expected. They have also not mentioned any external factors that may have had an impact on the operation of the aircraft. So the only thing left is the pilots.
I had hoped that there was some exculpatory external factor such as last minute windshear. But alas nothing explains away the incompetence.
The NTSB even mentioned the light glare reported by the PF at 500, but even clarified that thR light was big a significant factor knbthr operation oc the aircraft. That the light had not had much if sm impact on the pilot's vision. That he was immediately after able to look at the PAPI lights, which he acknowledged was showing 3 red lights with less than a minute of flight left and plenty of altitude to call for a go around and power up the engines.
They could try to figure out why they had lost glidepath altitude after their recent attitude correction to change to a descent even with the glidepath, and why the airplane was not performing as they has expected. Their plane was also starting to significantly loose airspeed.
Nothing external can account for their failing to monitor altitude and airspeed. The record shows that they failed to monitor these two critical values, and failed to respond to these signs if an unstable approach until AFTER it was too late.
Note that in mentioning the insignificant bright light at 500 ft, the NTSB is making clear by inference that there is no other more important external factor that has not been briefed.
The case is clear. The NTSB just needs to corroborate their findings and write ug down in a written report before they come out and make conclusions. Plus they need to look around and dig through records of flight training and operation of aircraft by the pilots in question as well as the airline they fly for.
When they issue a report they not only tell us what happened (everyone already knows) but also why. Not only the proximate cause (incompetence: the pilots can't fly manual of they don't understand auto-throttle settings) but the ultimate cause of the crash and the pilot incompetence. How can pilots rack up so many thousands of hours on commercial aircraft and not be able to competently command an aircraft in perfect conditions. They'll look at company policies and relevant regulatory safety protocols.
They will likely recommend changes to pilot training and safety regulations, to insure that pilots acquire, refresh or maintain, as necessary, the proper basic piloting skills that become lazy when one doesn't use them (flying automatic all the time).
But what happened or more importantly what didn't happen at the crucial moment, we already know that. The video, the eyewitness accounts, the CVR, and blackbox, and interviews are all consistent. Do we need anything more? All that's left is the final report and the tightening of part 129 rules that will follow, and the tightening of manual flying regs, be it additional sim time or a required number of manual landings and take-offs on a regular basis.
NTSB has made it clear that the aircraft was operating completely normally and as expected. They have also not mentioned any external factors that may have had an impact on the operation of the aircraft. So the only thing left is the pilots.
I had hoped that there was some exculpatory external factor such as last minute windshear. But alas nothing explains away the incompetence.
The NTSB even mentioned the light glare reported by the PF at 500, but even clarified that thR light was big a significant factor knbthr operation oc the aircraft. That the light had not had much if sm impact on the pilot's vision. That he was immediately after able to look at the PAPI lights, which he acknowledged was showing 3 red lights with less than a minute of flight left and plenty of altitude to call for a go around and power up the engines.
They could try to figure out why they had lost glidepath altitude after their recent attitude correction to change to a descent even with the glidepath, and why the airplane was not performing as they has expected. Their plane was also starting to significantly loose airspeed.
Nothing external can account for their failing to monitor altitude and airspeed. The record shows that they failed to monitor these two critical values, and failed to respond to these signs if an unstable approach until AFTER it was too late.
Note that in mentioning the insignificant bright light at 500 ft, the NTSB is making clear by inference that there is no other more important external factor that has not been briefed.
The case is clear. The NTSB just needs to corroborate their findings and write ug down in a written report before they come out and make conclusions. Plus they need to look around and dig through records of flight training and operation of aircraft by the pilots in question as well as the airline they fly for.
When they issue a report they not only tell us what happened (everyone already knows) but also why. Not only the proximate cause (incompetence: the pilots can't fly manual of they don't understand auto-throttle settings) but the ultimate cause of the crash and the pilot incompetence. How can pilots rack up so many thousands of hours on commercial aircraft and not be able to competently command an aircraft in perfect conditions. They'll look at company policies and relevant regulatory safety protocols.
They will likely recommend changes to pilot training and safety regulations, to insure that pilots acquire, refresh or maintain, as necessary, the proper basic piloting skills that become lazy when one doesn't use them (flying automatic all the time).
But what happened or more importantly what didn't happen at the crucial moment, we already know that. The video, the eyewitness accounts, the CVR, and blackbox, and interviews are all consistent. Do we need anything more? All that's left is the final report and the tightening of part 129 rules that will follow, and the tightening of manual flying regs, be it additional sim time or a required number of manual landings and take-offs on a regular basis.
* sorry, clarified that the light source was NOT a significant factor, and not having any significant impact on the operation of the aircraft.
That the PF was still able to look out the window and see 3 red PAPI lights at 500. (if only it had been 4 red PAPI at that point and they might've gone around sooner, and made for a less eventful week.
That the PF was still able to look out the window and see 3 red PAPI lights at 500. (if only it had been 4 red PAPI at that point and they might've gone around sooner, and made for a less eventful week.
[This poster has been suspended.]
That's provocative. People blindly think somebody is looking out for them. I have always said " if I ever entertain getting on a bus anywhere in the world in the mountains, please slap me!" Some airlines may rate the same wariness.
No way. They've already proven themselves to be incompetent.
Unfortunately, the sad truth is that they're not unique, nor rare among commercial airline pilots, especially at some carriers, or on dome types. There are lots of pilots with less than proficient manual piloting skills flying commercial airliners every day.
I'd rather we deal ASAP with the structural issues that allow pilots with poor manual piloting skills to fly major airliners with paying passengers, and fix their skill deficiency.
We don't need a repeat. The next time might not be as fortunate.
And they prob need shoulder straps for passengers in the back of the plane too.
Unfortunately, the sad truth is that they're not unique, nor rare among commercial airline pilots, especially at some carriers, or on dome types. There are lots of pilots with less than proficient manual piloting skills flying commercial airliners every day.
I'd rather we deal ASAP with the structural issues that allow pilots with poor manual piloting skills to fly major airliners with paying passengers, and fix their skill deficiency.
We don't need a repeat. The next time might not be as fortunate.
And they prob need shoulder straps for passengers in the back of the plane too.
[This poster has been suspended.]
"I have been a Capt on 767 & 777 for a long time now and stick and rudder skills for a lot of pilots are way off of what I think they should be. But I also don’t like the use of AT’s at takeoffs nor do I like the use of Cat II & III ILS’s and in ten thousand hours in the 67 & 77 I have done 1 auto landing in real life. Pilots skills have went way down even in GA 75% of the SR-22, 172’s or others have auto pilots that was not even thought about when some of us old school guys was learning to fly. If you look at the NTSB’s list each month you will see well over 50% of the accidents are due to pilots not doing the simplest things that any of us should be able to do."
This pervasive use of automation even in GA, is the reason why I was impressed some weeks back when a GA pilot lost all his instruments, radio and auomation, was able to continue flying VFR to his destination airport (Grand Junction) and land without incident. He even thought to call ahead to the airport to let them know he was coming, since his radio was out too. He happened to get the TSA office, and gave them a headline.
But a pilot who had become used to flying with all the fancy automation, flew without any of that stuff (even as backup). All he had was his gauges, and the view out his window. He did fine. Even though he did not get up that morning thinking that he'd get in a plane and lose all of his electronics and have to rely on his foundational pilot skills to get home that day.
These big time commercial pilots with tens of thousands of hours in the seat were not able to live up to the same standard, even with all the fancy equipment in perfect functioning condition. They had 300 souls in the seats behind them. That other guy only had his hide in the plane.
This pervasive use of automation even in GA, is the reason why I was impressed some weeks back when a GA pilot lost all his instruments, radio and auomation, was able to continue flying VFR to his destination airport (Grand Junction) and land without incident. He even thought to call ahead to the airport to let them know he was coming, since his radio was out too. He happened to get the TSA office, and gave them a headline.
But a pilot who had become used to flying with all the fancy automation, flew without any of that stuff (even as backup). All he had was his gauges, and the view out his window. He did fine. Even though he did not get up that morning thinking that he'd get in a plane and lose all of his electronics and have to rely on his foundational pilot skills to get home that day.
These big time commercial pilots with tens of thousands of hours in the seat were not able to live up to the same standard, even with all the fancy equipment in perfect functioning condition. They had 300 souls in the seats behind them. That other guy only had his hide in the plane.
I think I've been consistent.
Seems to me that they were unable to perform the basic responsibilty of a pilot with 300 souls, which is to get the plane back down to earth in one piece with everyone alive, on a clear day with no external mitigating factors.
This could've happened to anyone. Everyone's had an 'oh shit' moment. But they failed the most basic of pilot responsibility - to monitor airspeed and altitude on final approach, which in their case resulted in hull loss, and loss of human life. Doesn't get worse than that.
I find that to be incompetence, and I would not want to fly with them. I will grant you that none of these pilots are likely to repeat such a ridiculous simple mistake, and be involved in another tragic crash. They'll likely be too vigilant. If allowed to fly, they'll likely never let their manual piloting skills get stale.
Some people want blood. And it seems appropriate that the victims, survivors and victims' families get justice. Manslaughter convictions seem appropriate.
For me, I don't care if they go to jail. But I do care to learn from year mistake, and use this tragedy as an opportunity to insure that similar crashes do not happen in the future.
More impacrful would be a worldwide tour of shame, explaining to pilots how important it is to keep manual piloting skills fresh when 100's of lives are in your hands.
My only dog in this race is insuring a safer future for commercial aviation.
Seems to me that they were unable to perform the basic responsibilty of a pilot with 300 souls, which is to get the plane back down to earth in one piece with everyone alive, on a clear day with no external mitigating factors.
This could've happened to anyone. Everyone's had an 'oh shit' moment. But they failed the most basic of pilot responsibility - to monitor airspeed and altitude on final approach, which in their case resulted in hull loss, and loss of human life. Doesn't get worse than that.
I find that to be incompetence, and I would not want to fly with them. I will grant you that none of these pilots are likely to repeat such a ridiculous simple mistake, and be involved in another tragic crash. They'll likely be too vigilant. If allowed to fly, they'll likely never let their manual piloting skills get stale.
Some people want blood. And it seems appropriate that the victims, survivors and victims' families get justice. Manslaughter convictions seem appropriate.
For me, I don't care if they go to jail. But I do care to learn from year mistake, and use this tragedy as an opportunity to insure that similar crashes do not happen in the future.
More impacrful would be a worldwide tour of shame, explaining to pilots how important it is to keep manual piloting skills fresh when 100's of lives are in your hands.
My only dog in this race is insuring a safer future for commercial aviation.
[This poster has been suspended.]
Glad I didn't go with UAL. Could have.....back in 85, but there was the strike and then of course there was chapter 11. Would have lost most of my pension with UAL as well. Til BK, I would have been well ahead with UAL but as it turned out I was probably at least 1 million to the good!!!
I'm not an advocate for jail, mostly because of the reasons you mention.
But I strongly suggest a period of purgatory, or a shame tour or whatever you want to call it.
Basically a time to bring the entire commercial aviation industry's attention to the need to keep manual piloting skills up to par.
A tour of shame that provides an opportunity to atone for their mistake was be most cultural appropriate to the compete loss of face that they experience in Korean culture. Gives them an opportunity to rebuild their character, their reputation and third honor. At this point they've gone from top dog to zero in their culture.
I would co-op this outward expression of shame that would be far worse than jail in their culture, but more beneficial not only in rebuilding their personal/professional lives, but also in repairing an important deficiency in commercial aviation. Hopefully, it will help avoid future needless crashes that need not happen.
But I strongly suggest a period of purgatory, or a shame tour or whatever you want to call it.
Basically a time to bring the entire commercial aviation industry's attention to the need to keep manual piloting skills up to par.
A tour of shame that provides an opportunity to atone for their mistake was be most cultural appropriate to the compete loss of face that they experience in Korean culture. Gives them an opportunity to rebuild their character, their reputation and third honor. At this point they've gone from top dog to zero in their culture.
I would co-op this outward expression of shame that would be far worse than jail in their culture, but more beneficial not only in rebuilding their personal/professional lives, but also in repairing an important deficiency in commercial aviation. Hopefully, it will help avoid future needless crashes that need not happen.
V-ref = 137
lowest recorded speed = 103
Don't matter what you set it at, if the AT are off and the throttles are just a fancy handrest or worse hands completely off. The plane with engines idling will go whatever speed it wants or whatever speed it can muster as it's falling out of the sky in a descent. But pointing the nose up just won't work if you want to stay on speed at idle. Gravity only works but one way for large aircraft.